For David Lewis, an action is a choice of a contingency plan. The plans come as whole units and so far do not appear to be conceived as divisible.

“It should not disturb us that this is a problem of coordinating contingency plans, not—as in the previous coordination problems—of coordinating actions themselves. We are treating the agent’s *choice* of a contingency plan as an action—one that is part of his action of choosing a contingency plan and then acting on it. An agent’s action according to a contingency plan is regarded as consisting of two phases: choice of a contingency plan and fulfillment of the chosen plan. His choice is concentrated in the first phase; his use of his ability to tell which contingency holds in the second. The agents’ coordination problem pertains only to the first phase… We count the difference in contingency plan as making a difference in his action, even though it is a difference that turns out not to matter.”

How do people come to have the same contingency plans?

The problems with this come in the lack of generalization as well as the nature of the discrete actions, messages, meanings, and contingency plans. I propose a more general framework that takes these into account.

Want to know:

* Does David Lewis deal with the generalization problem that occurs when performing communications that have not previously been encountered?
* Does David Lewis deal with how members of a language community come to agree upon “contingency plans”?
* Does he deal with how coordination of contingency plans is established in the general case?

It appears as if he deals with generalization problem by proposing that we coordinate, not on rote contingency plans, but on more abstracted contingency plans in the form of formal grammars. This is a pretty insightful approach, but is not compatible with a more modern understanding of language! Also, I have not read this far, so It is only a prediction…